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Abstract 
The observed racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership among older adults is 
substantial. We investigate socio-economic, cognitive and cultural barriers underling it. As 
additional potential barriers are accounted for, the residual gaps in financial inclusion with respect 
to Whites is reduced by 19 percent for Blacks and 46 percent for Hispanics. We find that 
citizenship and “taste for privacy” play a limited role for both minority groups, while real asset 
ownership, health, cognitive ability and cultural hurdles contribute substantially to the gap. For 
Hispanics, language barriers explain most of the gap, while neighborhood-level socioeconomic 
characteristics are more salient for Blacks. We also examine how the racial/ethnic composition of 
couples influences financial decisions. We estimate a significantly smaller residual gap between 
“mixed” and White couples than between minority and White couples. We provide empirical 
evidence suggesting that, other things equal, mixed couples are less concerned with the 
cultural/psychological barriers facing minority couples.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Access to financial services has become an important policy issue in developed countries where, 
notably, a large proportion of the population lacks access to basic financial services. About 20 
percent of the population are unbanked in the European Union and the United Kingdom (Datta 
2009). According to the latest National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2016), 7 percent 
of households were unbanked in 2015 in the United States.  
Being unbanked is associated with higher transactional costs and poor saving behavior. 
Individuals without a bank account are likely to save less and incur significant monetary costs for 
everyday transactions (Carbo Valverde, Gardener, and Molyneux 2005; Thaler 1999). Considering 
only the transaction fees when using non-bank payment services (thus, excluding costs associated 
with the loss of interest earned on savings, lack of protection, etc.), it has been estimated that the 
cost of being unbanked in the United States represents around 4 percent of median household 
income (Caskey et al., 2006). Lack of participation in the financial sector is also related to the 
ability to effectively plan for the future. Lack of interaction with financial institutions, in fact, is 
likely to decrease individuals’ knowledge of existing financial products that can be used to save 
for retirement (Clarke and Ambrosio 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011).1  
Minorities in the United States (U.S.) are more likely to be unbanked and underbanked 
(Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee, 2005). Latest data on the unbanked shows that while the unbanked 
rate among non-Hispanic White households is 4 percent, Hispanic and Black households exhibit 																																																								
1 As recently showed by Aguila, Angrisani and Blanco (2016) ownership of a bank account is likely to reduce stress 
and improve mental health and wellbeing, especially among Hispanics, who face higher cultural barriers to financial 
inclusion.  
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the highest unbanked rates, with 20 percent and 21 percent, respectively (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 2016). Also, while the likelihood of having a checking or savings account 
increases steadily with age among non-Hispanic Whites, minority older adults remain noticeably 
unbanked. Black and Hispanic individuals age 65 and older are approximately two times less likely 
than their White counterparts to have a bank account (AARP Public Policy Institute 2010).  
As of 2014, individuals 65 and older represent 14.5 percent of the U.S. population and this 
fraction is expected to grow to 21.7 percent by 2060. Blacks age 65 and older represent 9 percent 
of the older population in the U. S. and by 2060 this percentage is projected to grow to 12 percent. 
The proportion of older Hispanics is expected to grow more rapidly. As of 2014, Hispanics age 65 
and older represent 8 percent of the older population, a fraction that will rise to 22 percent by 2060 
(Administration for Community Living, 2014). In view of the growing presence of Hispanic and 
Black minorities in the U.S. and the rapid aging of the population, these statistics constitute a cause 
of national concern as the financial health and economic security of more and more households is 
expected to be at risk in the near future. These statistics also call for a deeper understanding of the 
saving behavior of more vulnerable groups and the barriers they face towards participation in the 
formal financial sector. This knowledge is crucial for devising and implementing interventions 
that can effectively change financial decision making among households where resources are most 
scarce and cultural/psychological hurdles more difficult to overcome. In this paper, we take on this 
task by investigating what determines the racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership among older 
adults in the U.S. and identify the main factors that are responsible for it.   
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we use a representative 
sample of the U.S. population over the age of 50, drawn from the Health and Retirement Study 
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(HRS) over the period 2000-2012, and assess differences in financial inclusion of Hispanic and 
Black households with respect to their non-Hispanic White counterparts.2 While, for the reasons 
given above, minority older adults constitute an interesting case study, they have not been the 
focus of attention in previous work. Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee (2005) consider the entire U.S. 
population and analyze the socioeconomic characteristics, among them age and race, associated 
with bank account ownership. Lusardi (2005) examines the financial behavior of individuals 
between the ages of 40 and 65, arguing that high information and learning costs prevent minorities 
from accessing basic financial services and accumulating enough retirement wealth.  
Second, exploiting the richness of information available in the HRS, we build on the 
empirical models adopted in previous studies and amend them with additional factors that are 
presumably related to the observed racial/ethnic gap in bank ownership. Specifically, we gauge 
the relative importance of 1) real asset holdings, 2) health status and cognitive ability, 3) being 
foreign born and citizenship status, 4) “taste for privacy,” and 5) language barriers in explaining 
the lack of financial inclusion among minorities, above and beyond the explanatory power of 
conventional socioeconomic characteristics, like education, income, and wealth, that have been 
used in the previous work. Moreover, relying on restricted geographic identifiers, we condition 
our analysis on the characteristics of the neighborhood where households reside. To the best of our 
knowledge, such comprehensive analysis of what prevents access to basic financial services among 
older minorities has not been performed before.  
																																																								
2 In our analysis we use the term financial inclusion to refer to individual participation in the formal financial sector 
through the ownership of a bank account. Lack of basic financial services in our study refers to the lack of bank 
account ownership. 
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Third, the design of the HRS allows us to explore how the racial and ethnic composition 
of couples is related to access to financial services. Specifically, we investigate whether the 
behavior of couples with both minority members is different from that of “mixed” couples, where 
only one member belongs to a minority group. Looking at possible spousal effects in terms of 
financial inclusion constitutes a major, innovative contribution of our study.         
Finally, from a methodological point of view, we take full advantage of the long panel data 
set at our disposal and estimate both random-effects (RE) and correlated random-effects (CRE) 
models. In the latter case, we include averages of time-varying variables, which allow us to control 
more encompassingly for unobserved heterogeneity across households. Previous work has relied 
on RE models (e.g., Rhine and Greene, 2006) only. 
We document that minority older adults are significantly less likely to own a bank account 
than their White counterparts after controlling for a comprehensive set of socioeconomic variables 
and neighborhood characteristics. As we account for additional potential barriers to financial 
inclusion, the residual gap with respect to Whites is reduced by 19 percent for Blacks and by 46 
percent for Hispanics. We find that nativity, citizenship and “taste for privacy,” as measured by 
lack of consent to sharing Social Security number with HRS, play no important role in determining 
differences across racial/ethnic groups. Ownership of real assets, health and cognitive ability 
account together for about 3 percentage points of the minority gap in ownership of a bank account. 
While socio-economic characteristics at the individual and neighborhood level (especially income 
and wealth) are more likely to explain differences between Blacks and Whites, language is a 
critical determinant of the existing gap in bank account ownership between Hispanics and Whites. 
This is consistent with the findings of the 2015 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s biennial 
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survey on unbanked and underbanked households which indicates that households that speak only 
Spanish are unbanked (defined as lacking a checking or savings account) at five times the rate of 
households where Spanish is not the only language spoken (FDIC, 2016). Plausibly, lack of 
English proficiency may also be the manifestation of other cultural and behavioral barriers 
associated with little assimilation/acculturation. Our results also show that minority couples are 
from 13 to 10 percentage points less likely than White couples and from 10 to 7 percentage points 
less likely than “mixed” couples to own a bank account. Notably, the gap in bank account 
ownership between “mixed” and White couples is small at around 3 percentage points across 
different specifications. We use different specifications to assess the contribution of assortative 
mating to our results and do not find it to be large. Yet, we remain cautious in interpreting our 
findings as evidence of spousal spillovers in financial-decision making as we cannot completely 
rule out assortative mating on unobservable preferences/tastes for managing household finances 
and adopting financial instruments.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature review on the 
determinants of access to financial services. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and methodology 
used in this study, respectively. Section 5 presents the results from the analysis, and Section 6 
concludes. 
2. DETERMINANTS OF ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Financial inclusion is clearly determined by both demand and supply factors. As far as the 
former, there is ample evidence that access to financial services is closely related to socioeconomic 
status (SES), with the rate of unbanked individuals being significantly higher among low-educated 
and low-income groups (Anderloni et al. 2008; Claessens 2006). Similarly, ethnic and racial 
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minorities are less likely to own checking and savings accounts and other financial instruments 
(Atkinson 2006; Carbo Valverde, Gardener, and Molyneux 2005; Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee 
2005; Robles 2009). Bogan (2014) highlights that poor health and limited cognitive ability, such 
as numeracy and memory, directly contribute to the lack of participation in financial markets, 
especially for among more vulnerable groups. 
Language and cultural barriers may prevent some segments of the population from 
accessing financial services (Collard, Kempson, and Whyley 2001; Rhine and Greene 2006; 
Caskey et al. 2006; Barcellos et al. 2016; Robles 2014), alongside with legal status and long-term 
plans for residency (Datta 2009). Bogan (2014) documents that immigrants from countries with 
more exposure to financial services are more likely to participate in the financial system in the 
U.S. Furthermore, Northwood and Rhine (2016) find that Mexicans and Latin Americans 
immigrants have a higher probability of using nonbank financial services (payday loans, pawn 
shops, remittances, among others) than native born with similar education and income levels.  
There are also behavioral issues related to subjective perceptions of the costs and benefits 
of owning a bank account. Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2004) argue that when studying 
individuals’ usage of financial services not only major factors, such as the cost of a bank account, 
financial education, and availability of financial information should be taken into consideration, 
but also small situational barriers, like distance from a bank, hours of service, bank customer 
service, and concerns related to consumer privacy. Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee (2004) investigate 
subjective reasons behind the decision of remaining unbanked. They observe that most individuals 
cite account features, such as minimum balance, service charges and usefulness of checks, as 
reasons for not owning a bank account. Motivational (not having enough money) and institutional 
	 7	
(not wanting to deal with banks) reasons are mentioned by around 20 percent of unbanked 
individuals. Interestingly, account features receive similar weights within SES and racial/ethnic 
groups.        
Regarding the supply side, financial institutions tend to be scarcer in disadvantaged and 
diverse communities (Rubin, 2007). Because of lack of profitability, banks might not offer 
adequate services to certain groups, especially the most vulnerable such as low SES individuals, 
the elderly, and minorities (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2011). Straight (2002) analyzes 
asset accumulation differences between Whites and Blacks between 1995 and 1998 and argues 
that lower accumulation for Blacks is partly due to the supply of financial services. Choudhury 
(2001) mentions that, by primarily targeting Whites, financial institutions may have created a 
cultural bias against holding financial assets among minorities. Stevenson and Plath (2006), 
document that financial institutions have not fully developed strategies to reach Hispanics because 
they have not considered Hispanics’ preferences and trust towards institutions that understand their 
culture, particularly language. Community and neighborhood environments as well as peer effects, 
participation in the cash economy and informal saving circles are critical aspects to consider when 
studying financial inclusion (Robles 2009, 2014). Bohn and Pearlman (2013) show that enclaves, 
defined as areas with high concentrations of immigrants from the same region, play an important 
role in determining racial/ethnic differences in bank use. Bogan (2004) observes that immigrants 
who live around other immigrants have less exposure and information about the financial system 
than immigrants that live in a community of native U.S. citizens. A similar argument applies to 
ethnic concentration impacting negatively participation in the financial system. Along the same 
lines, Vermilyea and Wilcox (2002), using data from a survey conducted in Los Angeles and New 
York in the late 1990s, document that the racial composition of the neighborhood affects the 
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likelihood of owning a bank account and that individuals living in Census tracts with higher share 
of Hispanics or Blacks are less likely to own a bank account.  
Building on the existing literature, our study aims at comprehensively examining the 
determinants of the observed racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership, with a specific focus 
on the population over the age of 50. Even though they are projected to constitute an increasing 
fraction of the U.S. population and often face more-difficult-to-overcome hurdles towards 
financial inclusion, older minorities have received relatively little attention in previous work on 
this topic.3 For the purposes of our analysis, we take advantage of the richness of information 
elicited by the HRS questionnaire and amend previously estimated models with both individual-
level and neighborhood-level variables that are bound to influence the decision of being unbanked. 
These include, but are not limited to, household wealth composition, health status and cognitive 
ability, immigration and citizenship status, taste for privacy, language barriers, neighborhood SES 
status, and supply of formal financial institutions. We show that such a richer model, featuring an 
exhaustive range of both demand- and supply-side factors, can explain a significant fraction of the 
observed racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership and identify the variables that contribute the 
most to explaining high unbanked rates among older minorities.      
3. DATA  
We use data from Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the period 2000-2012 and restrict 
our sample to individuals 51 to 90 years old. This group includes retirees, as well as workers on 
																																																								
3 Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) document that financial literacy is significantly lower among older Blacks and Hispanics 
than among older Whites. This phenomenon is consistent with the fact that older minorities exhibit higher unbanked 
rates and, as a result, are more likely to miss on the opportunity to acquire basic knowledge of existing financial 
products.  
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the verge of retirement, a time when sound financial decisions are critical to ensure future 
economic wellbeing and income security at older ages. We focus on individuals who are 
designated as the financial respondent of the household (e.g., the person mostly responsible of and 
knowledgeable about household financial matters). We exclude individuals over the age of 90, as 
they are at a higher risk of physical/cognitive impairments that could potentially preclude them 
from being able to personally manage their finances and, therefore, from having a bank account.4  
The HRS is a multipurpose, longitudinal household survey representing the U.S. 
population over the age of 50. Since 1992, it has surveyed age-eligible individuals and their 
spouses on a biannual basis to track transitions from work to retirement, to measure economic 
wellbeing and changes in financial situation over time, and to monitor individuals’ health as they 
age. The HRS oversamples Blacks and Hispanics, making it an ideal data set to examine racial/ 
ethnic disparities in bank account ownership. These two minority groups exhibit very similar 
recruitment and response rates at baseline and retention/attrition in follow-ups as Whites (Ofstedal 
and Weir, 2011). This is important for the purposes of our study as it does not introduce biases due 
to differential/selective participation in the survey among different racial/ethnic groups. 
Our dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for access to financial services (i.e., 
financial inclusion), taking value 1 if the individual owns a checking, savings or money market 
																																																								
4 The results of our analysis remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged when we include individuals above the 
age of 90. In the interest of space, we do report the results based on such extended sample. They are, however, available 
upon request. 	
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account. We assign individuals to three mutually exclusive groups, White non-Hispanic, Black 
non-Hispanic, and Hispanic (we drop respondents who report being of other races).5 
Our baseline specification mimics empirical models used in previous studies. It includes 
the following set of individual- and household-level characteristics: gender (male), a quadratic 
polynomial in age, education, an indicator for couple household (age-eligible respondent and 
spouse/partner are both interviewed), household size, work status, indicator for whether the 
respondent or the spouse/partner receives any social security or pension income, household 
income, and wealth tertiles. Year dummies and state dummies are also included to account for 
general trends in bank account ownership over the observation period and to control for state 
characteristics that can be correlated with the rate of unbanked individuals within different 
segments of the population.  
We amend the baseline specification with potential determinants of the racial/ethnic 
differential in financial inclusion that, because of data availability, have not featured models 
previously estimated in the literature. First, we take into account ownership of real assets, such as 
home and vehicles, as well as debt exposure. Second, we construct and control for indexes of 
overall health status and cognitive ability. Third, we include in the model indicators for nativity 
and citizenship, which may capture legal barriers to financial inclusion. Fourth, we consider a 
proxy for individual “taste for privacy” measured by the respondent’s consent to share their Social 
Security Number (SSN) with the HRS for administrative data linkage. Fifth, we control for 
whether the survey was answered in Spanish, indicating lack of English proficiency. Summary 
																																																								
5 Individuals from other races represent l2.8 percent of the sample of individuals who participate in the HRS during 
the period 2000-2012 (627 out of 22,423 individuals). For the sake of simplicity, throughout the text we often refer 
to Whites non-Hispanics as Whites and to Blacks non-Hispanics as Blacks. 
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statistics for all the individual- and household-level variables used in the analysis are shown in 
Table 1.  
We further expand our empirical specification with measures of neighborhood 
environments, like socioeconomic characteristics of residents and number of existing formal 
financial institutions. As mentioned above, these variables account for supply-side factors and 
peer/community effects that are bound to influence individuals’ access to formal financial services. 
For this purpose, we rely on restricted HRS geocodes, to obtain the census tract where respondents 
reside at the time of the interview. Following Diez Roux et al. (2001), we construct a neighborhood 
SES index at the census tract level. Additionally, we create a variable recording the number of 
financial institutions in the census tract where HRS respondents reside at the time of the interview. 
We also consider in our analysis the racial/ethnic composition and primary language spoken by 
residents at the census tract level. Summary statistics for neighborhood-level variables are 
presented in Table 2. Full details for individual, household and neighborhood level variable 
construction and sources are available in Table A1 in the Appendix. Table A2 presents the 
distribution of race and ethnicity in our sample by wave, while Table A3 shows summary statistics 
by race/ethnicity for selected variables.  
4. METHODOLOGY 
The decision to own a bank account can conveniently be given a latent-variable 
interpretation. Indicate the net utility of owning a bank account for individual i at time t with: 
!"#∗ = &' +	&*+", + 	&-."#, 	+	/" +	0"#                                (1) 
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where z represents time-invariant characteristics, among others the individual’s racial/ethnic 
group, and the vector x includes time-varying individual- and household-level variables as well as 
environmental factors, such as SES neighborhood characteristics and availability of financial 
institutions in the place of residence. The term /" represents unobserved, time-invariant individual 
preference/taste for financial inclusion, while 0"# is an idiosyncratic shock assumed to be 
orthogonal to the explanatory variables.  
Utility-maximizing individuals choose to own a bank account if and only if the net utility 
they get is greater than the one they would obtain under the alternative scenario of being unbanked. 
Denoting our indicator of financial inclusion with y, we would therefore observe: 
1"# = 	 21	45	!"#∗ > 00	45	!"#∗ ≤ 0                                                              (2) 
where normalizing the net utility of being unbanked to 0 is without loss of generality as long as 
an intercept is included in equation (1). Assuming that  
9[/"|+", ."#] = 0,                                                                   (3) 
the binary, latent-variable model described by equations (1) and (2): 
1"# = &' +	&*+", + 	&-."#, 	+ 	/" +	0"#,                                 (4) 
can be estimated using a random-effects (RE) linear probability model.  
The assumption that unobserved individual preference/taste for bank account ownership is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of the model is undoubtedly restrictive. Yet, relaxing 
equation (3) implies that the parameters of the model cannot be consistently estimated unless the 
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time-invariant individual heterogeneity represented by /" is removed. This can be done via fixed-
effects (FE) estimation, which, however, comes at the cost of not being able to identify the effect 
of time-invariant covariates on the dependent variable. For the purposes of our study, this is a 
major drawback as our interest lies in assessing the racial/ethnic gap in financial inclusion. 
Confronted with a similar situation, Rhine and Greene (2006) opt for maintaining assumption (3) 
and estimate the model in equation (4) by RE Probit. We follow a different approach.  
The RE and FE models can be unified by explicitly modeling the relationship between /" 
and ."# and, therefore, by somehow relaxing the assumption in equation (3). Specifically, if /" =	>.̅", + 	@", where .̅" denotes individual-specific time averages and 9[@"|.̅"] = 0, equation (4) can 
be rewritten as:  
1"# = &' +	&*+", + 	&-."#, 	+ 	>.̅", + 	@" +	0"#.                     (5) 
This is known as a correlated random effects (CRE) model (Wooldridge 2010). As originally 
shown by Mundlak (1978), estimating &- in equation (5) by RE is equivalent to estimating &- in 
equation (4) by FE. Such result arises because .̅" takes into account the correlation between the 
time-varying variables ."# and the time-invariant, unobserved individual preferences/tastes /". 
Moreover, since equation (5) is treated as a RE model, it is possible to estimate the effect of the 
time-invariant covariates +", which would be otherwise wiped out by a within/FE transformation. 
It should be noted that for the estimate of &* to be consistent the condition 9[@"|+", ."#] = 0 still 
needs to hold. While this may not be a serious concern for our main variable of interest – 
race/ethnicity – the assumption that individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with other time-
invariant variables in our data, like education, may appear too restrictive. For this reason, we must 
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use caution when interpreting the estimate of &*. Nonetheless, the presence of .̅" ensures that the 
parameter estimates for &* are net of the correlation between /" and ."#.  
           We carry out our empirical analysis using both the RE and the CRE estimation approaches, 
but focus our discussion on the CRE results. The RE estimation approach makes our results more 
directly comparable to those of previous studies on the topic that have commonly estimated RE 
models (Lusardi 2005; Rhine and Greene 2006). The CRE estimation approach allows specifying 
a less restrictive within-individual error structure and to obtain estimates of time-invariant 
variables that are corrected for individual heterogeneity as measured by across-individual 
differences in time-varying covariates. Moreover, by comparing the results of the RE and CRE 
estimations, we can assess the extent to which controlling more encompassingly for individual 
heterogeneity in our model affects the size of the estimated racial/ethnic gap in bank account 
ownership.     
5. RESULTS 
Bank Account Ownership by Race and Ethnicity of the Household Financial Respondent 
Table 3 shows the percentage of households who do not own a bank account by race and 
ethnicity of the financial respondent and, separately, for each survey year. As can be seen, there 
exists a significant racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership. During the 2000-2012 period, 
while only 9 percent of non-Hispanic White households do not own a bank account, 35 and 38 
percent of Black and Hispanic households are unbanked, respectively. Interestingly, the fraction 
of unbanked households has increased significantly for all groups around the time of the Great 
Recession (December 2007-June 2009) and remained somewhat higher than the pre-crisis level, 
especially among Hispanics. The unbanked rates in our sample, which only includes individuals 
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age 51-90, are higher than those for the adult population as a whole (at least 18 years of age). 
Indeed, according to the National Survey of the Unbanked and Underbanked Households, the 
unbanked rates among White, Black and Hispanic households in 2011 are 4, 20 and 21, 
respectively (FDIC, 2011), hence much lower than those observed in the HRS and reported in 
Table 3 for the either 2010 or 2012. In view of these differences, the results of our analysis should 
not be generalized to the entire adult population. They are, instead, specific of middle-age and 
older adults and illustrative of the barrier towards financial inclusion faced by minorities within 
this segment of the population. As argued above, given the increasing share of minorities in the 
U.S. and the rapid aging of the population, studying the banking situation of minority older adults 
is an important contribution of this paper, especially because minority older adults have not been 
the focus of previous work on the topic of financial inclusion. When looking at cross-wave 
transitions (Table A4 in the Appendix), we observe that Blacks and Hispanics are substantially 
more likely than Whites to pass from having to not having a bank account (13 and 18 percentage 
points, respectively) and less likely to be banked if they were unbanked in the previous wave (29 
and 31 percentage points, respectively).  
We estimate the CRE model in equation (5) using seven specifications. Starting from a 
conventional baseline model, we sequentially add variables measuring economic status, health, 
cognitive ability, and cultural barriers to bank account ownership facing minority older adults. 
Table 4 shows the residual gap across progressively richer specifications, as measured by the 
coefficients on the indicators for whether the household financial respondent is either Black or 
Hispanic (Whites are the reference group).6  
																																																								
6 The estimated coefficients for all variables included in the CRE model is provided in Table A5 in the Appendix. The 
very same regressions are also estimated via RE. The corresponding results are presented in Table A6 in the Appendix. 
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In our baseline specification, Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to own a bank account 
than Whites by 15 percentage points. As we account for additional potential barriers to bank 
account ownership, the residual gap for minorities is reduced, although to a different extent for 
Blacks and Hispanics. In our full model, Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to own a bank account 
than Whites by 12 and 8 percentage points, respectively. Thus, compared to the baseline model, 
the estimated residual gap is cut by 19 percent for Blacks and 46 percent for Hispanics.  
Among the determinants of the gap, ownership of real assets accounts for about 1.5 
percentage points for both minority groups. Together, physical and cognitive health account for 
an additional 1 percentage point of the racial/ethnic gap. Indicators of foreign nativity do not 
appear to explain the residual gap in financial inclusion for minority groups. Taste for privacy, 
proxied by the consent to share the Social Security number with HRS, does not correlate with bank 
account ownership. We acknowledge that this measure is imperfect, not only due to the large 
proportion of missing values, but also because it may reflect reluctance of illegal immigrants to 
provide their SSN (if available). Lack of English proficiency, as measured by whether the HRS 
questionnaire was answered in Spanish, is the factor contributing the most to the gap in bank 
ownership for Hispanics (approximately 4 percentage points above and beyond the contribution 
of all the other variables described so far). This is in line with a recent report of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, according to which Spanish-only speaking households are five times less 
likely to use a bank or credit union (FDIC, 2016). Lack of English proficiency may also more 
broadly be interpreted as lower cultural assimilation. This, in turn, may lead Hispanic immigrants 
to be unfamiliar with the U.S. financial system and/or to mistrust financial institutions based on 
experiences in their countries of origin (Osili and Paulson, 2008).  
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Characteristics of the neighborhood where the individual currently resides, such a 
neighborhood SES index and number of financial institutions (weighted by population), do not 
explain much of the observed White/Minority gap in financial inclusion beyond and above what 
is already accounted for by individual-level variables. It is worth noting that the contribution of 
the aforementioned variables to explaining the observed minority gap in financial inclusion is only 
marginally affected by the order in which the variables are entered in the model. 
We obtain similar results as those of Rhine and Greene (2006), who, relying on a RE Probit 
model, find that U.S. born Blacks and Hispanics are 13 and 8 percentage points more likely to be 
unbanked than U.S. born Whites, respectively. In our full model estimated by RE (Table A6 in the 
Appendix, Column 7), the gap for Blacks is 14 percentage points and the one for Hispanics is 10 
percentage points. These estimated gaps are reduced to 12 and 8, respectively, when estimation is 
carried out by CRE, which allows to better control for unobserved individual heterogeneity in 
financial decisions. 
The CRE model also delivers fixed-effects estimated coefficients of time-varying 
variables, which help identify the factors that contribute to changes in the decision to own a bank 
account. Among them, health and cognition play an important role. One standard deviation 
increase in the health index is associated with a 0.7 percentage-point increase in the likelihood of 
bank account ownership. This implies that the average individual moving from the top 5 percent 
to the bottom 5 percent of the health index distribution would be approximately 3 percentage points 
less likely to have a bank account. Cognition is also positively associated with financial inclusion. 
Compared to those in the first cognition index quartile, individuals in the second, third and fourth 
quartiles are from 1 to 2 percentage points more likely to own a bank account. It is worth noting 
that minorities are about 30 percentage points more like than Whites to be in the bottom 25 percent 
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of the cognition distribution and 15 percentage points less likely to be in the top 25 percent of the 
distribution. Consequently, they exhibit significantly lower propensity to be banked than Whites 
and, as discussed above, cognition is a significant contributor of this gap. There exist apparent 
income and wealth gradients. Compared to households in the first income tercile, those in the 
second and third are 2.7 and 3.4 percentage points more likely to hold a bank account, respectively. 
Similarly, compared to households in the first wealth tercile, those in the second and third are 4.6 
and 7.2 percentage points more likely to be banked, respectively. Moving in and out of work also 
affects the probability of bank account ownership. Interestingly, receiving a pension or Social 
Security benefits has a positive impact on financial inclusion. This may be related to the fact that 
often electronic payments of benefits are strongly encouraged (for Social Security benefits, they 
became mandatory starting from March 2013).      
Bank Account Ownership by Race and Ethnicity of the Couple 
We delve more into the household financial decision-making process and explore potential 
spousal effects on the choice of being unbanked. For this purpose, we restrict attention to couple 
households and create groups interacting race/ethnicity of the household financial respondent and 
his/her spouse or partner. Specifically, we separate the sample into (i) White couples, where both 
members are White; (ii) White–Minority couples, where one member is either Black or Hispanic 
(“mixed” couples); and (iii) Minority couples, where both members are either Black or Hispanic 
(Table A7 in Appendix shows summary statistics for race/ethnicity at the couple level).  
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients for the White-Minority and Minority couple 
indicators (White couples are the reference group) across our seven specifications. The results 
show that minority couples are from 10 to 7 percentage points less likely than “mixed” couples to 
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own a bank account. In our baseline specification, minority couples are 13 percentage points less 
likely to own a bank account than White couples. The residual gap decreases steadily as more 
hurdles to financial inclusion are considered in the regression equation. Compared to the baseline 
specification, the residual gap is about 3 percentage points (26 percent decrease) lower in the full 
model. Again, ownership of real assets, health, cognitive ability, and language barriers are the 
factors contributing the most to the reduction of the gap. In the last column of Table 5, the effect 
of language barriers is less pronounced than the one observed in Table 4 as minority couples are 
not just Hispanic couples for whom lack of English proficiency is most relevant. Notably, the gap 
in bank account ownership between “mixed” and White couples is small and remains virtually 
constant across model specifications (3 percentage points less than White couples). 
Since in our regressions we do not control for spouses’ specific characteristics (e.g., 
education, cognitive ability), we cannot rule out the possibility that these results are determined 
by assortative mating. For instance, conditional on education of the financial respondent, spouses 
in white, mixed and minority couples may have different levels of education or financial literacy, 
leading to the observed differences in the adoption of bank accounts (as long as, at least to some 
extent, financial decisions are made jointly within the household). To shed further light on this 
issue, we repeat the exercise in Table 5 restricting attention only to couples where both members 
have the same level of education. The results of these regressions (reported in Table A8 in the 
Appendix) are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. For minority couples, the gap in bank 
ownership relative to White couples is about 14 percentage points in the most parsimonious 
specification and it is reduced to 11 percentage points in the richest specification. In comparison, 
the gap between “mixed” and White couples is about 3 percentage points across all models. This 
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suggests that assortative mating, at least on the basis of education, does not play a major role in 
driving the findings in Table 5.7  
A potential mechanism for the lower gap of mixed couples estimated in Table 5 is that the 
spouse from the dominant race is also the one making financial decisions. To gain insight on this 
point, we distinguish between mixed couples with a White financial respondent and mixed couples 
with a minority financial respondent. The results of this additional analysis (presented in Table A9 
in the Appendix) show that the gap in bank account ownership relative to White couples is only 2 
percentage points and not statistically significant for mixed couples with a White financial 
decision-maker. For mixed couple with a minority financial decision-maker the gap is 4 percentage 
points and statistically significant, but still 6 percentage points lower than that of minority couples. 
Together with the empirical evidence described above, this suggests that spillovers within mixed 
couples, by which the minority financial decision maker assimilates the financial culture and/or 
learns financial literacy from the spouse, may help reduce barriers towards financial inclusion 
faced by only minority households. 
The Role of Household Financial Resources and Neighborhood Characteristics  
We further investigate the role of household financial resources and neighborhood characteristics 
by estimating our model separately for those with income, wealth and NSES index below and 
above the sample median. Table 6 presents the residual gap in bank ownership estimated using our 
richest specification separately for the aforementioned groups (Table A10 in the Appendix has the 
full set of estimates). As can be seen from Panel A of Table 6, for Blacks below median income, 
																																																								
7 We obtain very similar results if we control for the spouse’s educational attainment. To the extent that our CRE 
estimation strategy does not capture household-level preference for financial choices, assortative mating on these 
unobservable characteristics cannot be fully ruled out.  
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the probability of owning a bank account is 14 percentage points lower than for their White 
counterparts. This gap is reduced to 8 percentage points among older Blacks above median income. 
The null hypothesis that the gap is the same for both income groups is rejected at 1 percent 
significance level in favor of the alternative that it is larger for Blacks below median income. The 
differential gap in bank account ownership between Hispanics below and above median income is 
less pronounced and approximately equal to 2.5 percentage points, but still statistically significant.  
In Panel B of Table 6, we estimate sizeable (4 to 6 percentage points) and statistically 
significant differential gaps by wealth for both minority groups. Blacks below median wealth are 
13 percentage points less likely than Whites to own a bank account. This difference shrinks to 6 
percentage points among Blacks above median wealth. Similarly, Hispanics with wealth below 
and above the median are 9 and 5 percentage points more likely to be unbanked than Whites, 
respectively. The null hypothesis of no differential residual gap by wealth is rejected at 5 percent 
significance level against the alternative that the gap is larger for households below than above 
median wealth for both minority groups. 
In Panel C, we separate respondents living in low and high SES neighborhoods. For Blacks 
residing in neighborhoods with below-median SES, the estimated bank ownership gap with respect 
to their White counterparts is approximately 1 percentage point larger than for those living in 
above-median SES neighborhoods, and this difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
significance level. There is, instead, no apparent difference for Hispanics. These findings suggest 
a limited role of community spillovers and supply-side factors in explaining the minority gap in 
bank account ownership, above and beyond the influence of individual-level SES and 
circumstances. At the same time, the NSES index may mask heterogeneity in language and cultural 
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barriers faced by minority older adults, which appear to be the major drivers of lack of participation 
in the formal financial sector.  
We, therefore, explore the role of specific neighborhood factors, such as the racial and 
ethnic composition as well as the primary language spoken at the census tract where sample 
households reside. Table 7 shows the results when we add to the full model the percent of Blacks, 
Hispanics and Whites (columns 1 and 2) and the percent of those who primarily speak Spanish 
(columns 3 and 4) in the census tract. Holding these variables constant does not reduce the gap for 
Blacks and only marginally affects the gap for Hispanics (by less than 1 percentage point). 
Notably, the main contributor to explaining the Hispanic-White gap is still an individual’s lack of 
English proficiency, which does not seem to be proxied by neighborhood indicators for 
race/ethnicity and language at the census tract level. Indeed, when (in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7) 
we control for neighborhood racial/ethnic composition and main language, but we do not take into 
account whether the HRS survey was answered in Spanish, the estimated gap for Hispanics is 
slightly above 10 percentage points. It is, instead, reduced to 7.5 percentage points when the 
Spanish survey indicator is added to the set of regressors. 
While neighborhood racial composition and language seem to play a limited role in 
explaining the overall minority gap above and beyond household-level characteristics, one would 
still expect the gap to be wider in areas with larger concentrations of minorities, other things equal. 
To shed light on this point, we estimate our full model (including a control for whether the HRS 
questionnaire was answered in Spanish) for individuals who reside in census tracts with below and 
above median percentage of Hispanic residents (Panel A of Table 8) as well as with below and 
above median percentage of Spanish speakers (Panel B of Table 8). As can be seen, the observed 
gap between Hispanics and Whites is driven by those households residing in neighborhoods with 
	 23	
a relatively high representation of Hispanics and, therefore, Spanish-speaking individuals. 
Specifically, while there is virtually no noticeable residual gap in census tracts with below-median 
percentage of Spanish-speaking individuals, Hispanics are as much as 8 percentage points less 
likely than Whites to own a bank account in census tracts with above-median percentage of 
Spanish-speaking individuals. As mentioned above, lack of English proficiency, which may hinder 
one’s ability to navigate the U.S. financial system, is plausibly the manifestation other cultural and 
behavioral barriers associated with little assimilation/acculturation. The results in Table 8 
substantiate the expectation that such barriers are more easily formed and more difficult to 
overcome in relatively more segregated areas.  
Among these barriers, legal citizenship could represent a significant hurdle towards 
financial inclusion. In neighborhoods with a large representation of Hispanics and where Spanish 
is the predominant language, the number of illegal immigrants is likely higher and this may 
contribute to the differences estimated in Table 8.8 To gauge the importance of this potential 
contribution, one would ideally run the same regressions as above for census tracts with relatively 
low and high percentage of illegal residents. But, obviously, there is no official count of 
undocumented individuals.9 It should be noted that legal status is not a necessary condition to be 
banked. For example, major U.S. banks have been accepting the matricula consular (an ID card 
from the Mexican consulate issued to undocumented immigrants) to open an account. Legal status, 
																																																								
8 In our regressions we control for whether respondents consent to share their Social Security Number with the HRS 
for administrative data linkage. We have interpreted lack of consent as “taste for privacy.” However, it could also 
indicate absence of a legal identification document. 
9 As a very coarse approximation, we have estimated our model splitting the sample into census tracts below and 
above the median percentage of foreign-born residents and into census tracts below and above the median percentage 
non-citizen residents (non-citizen data are only available for 2012). While the White-minority gap tends to be larger 
in census tracts with a relatively larger proportion of foreign-born and non-citizen residents, there are no statistically 
significant difference across groups. The results have not been included in the interest of space, but are available upon 
request.   
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however, might add to the demand-side factors preventing financial inclusion of minorities, as 
mistrust in banking institutions may keep undocumented individuals in the cash economy. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data to investigate to what extent language barriers may also 
be a supply-side phenomenon stemming, for instance, from the shortfall of services in Spanish 
provided by financial institutions. Developments in the banking system in the last couple of 
decades, however, would suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. A 2006 report by the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates and supervises national banks, found that 
many banks have progressively expanded their provision of multilingual services. The largest 
increase has been observed for services in Spanish. This is not surprising as Hispanics have been 
the fastest growing minority group in the U.S. and have greatly gained in terms of purchasing 
power, thereby representing a source of retail growth for financial institutions. Major national 
banks now offer services in Spanish both online and in most branches, while credit unions 
increasingly reach out to the Hispanic community via targeted advertising material, pamphlets and 
posters in Spanish. 
  
Limitations 
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature by providing further insights onto the 
racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership. To this end, we exploit richer data than previously 
available to other authors and rely on a CRE estimation approach that, at least partially, accounts 
for individual heterogeneity. We recognize the following limitations of our study. First, we cannot 
rule out potential biases stemming from unobservable characteristics not captured by individual-
specific averages of time-varying variables. Hence, we must warn against considering our 
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estimates as causal. Second, and as already mentioned above, we must be cautious in interpreting 
the observed differences among white, mixed and minority couples as evidence of spousal/peer 
effects on bank account ownership. To the extent that the CRE model does not fully control for it, 
assortative mating on unobservable preferences/tastes for financial decision-making might drive 
our results. For future research, we warrant including parental SES and early-life family 
background characteristics to proxy for individuals’ attitude towards managing personal finances.  
Third, we only look at the impact of current neighborhood characteristics on the likelihood that 
older adults own a bank account. Clearly, early-life environmental circumstances are bound to be 
important as well in this domain, as they might shape wealth accumulation patterns and determine 
cultural integration. Unfortunately, the HRS does not provide data on early-life residence. This 
information would constitute a very valuable addition to gauge the potential role of neighborhood 
effects more generally.  
6. CONCLUSION 
We investigate the determinants of the racial/ethnic gap in bank account ownership among 
older adults in the U.S. Exploiting the wealth of information available in the HRS and its 
longitudinal dimension, we estimate CRE models for the probability of owning a bank account 
featuring a comprehensive range of household- and neighborhood-level explanatory variables. As 
additional potential barriers to financial inclusion are accounted for, the residual gaps between 
Blacks and Whites and between Hispanics and Whites are reduced by 18 percent and 46 percent, 
respectively. We find that citizenship and “taste for privacy,” as measured by lack of consent to 
share Social Security number with HRS, play a limited role for both minority groups. On the other 
hand, real asset ownership, health, and cognitive ability contribute substantially to the racial/ethnic 
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gap. Conditional on household-level SES measures, the effect of neighborhood socioeconomic 
characteristics, including the number of available financial institutions, is rather minor, although 
somewhat more pronounced for Blacks. On the other hand, we find that the Hispanic-White gap 
is significantly larger (8 percentage points) in neighborhoods with above-median percentage of 
Spanish-speaking individuals and negligible (about 0) in neighborhoods with below-median 
percentage of Spanish-speaking individuals. This points at the lack of English proficiency, which 
plausibly is the manifestation of little acculturation/assimilation, as one of the most important 
barriers towards financial inclusion for older Hispanic households. As noted by a recent Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau's report “there is a general understanding that language cannot always 
be separated from culture, and that offering information in languages other than English does not 
necessarily mean that all Limited English Proficient populations will be able to access, understand, 
or use the information provided.” The same report calls for more extensive educational campaign 
to reach out and engage underserved populations, especially minorities (Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, 2017).  
Our results also offer suggestive evidence of spousal effects in financial decisions. Indeed, 
we estimate a significantly smaller residual gap between “mixed” and White couples than between 
minority and White couples. We reach similar conclusions when we restrict attention to couples 
where both members have the same level of education to better control for assortative mating. Our 
findings may indicate that mixed couples are less concerned with the cultural/psychological 
barriers facing minority couples.  
Our work aims at providing a deeper understanding of the financial behavior of more 
vulnerable groups, such as minority older adults. This knowledge is crucial for devising 
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interventions that can effectively change financial decision-making among households where 
resources are most scarce and cultural hurdles more difficult to overcome.  	  
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TABLE 1 – Individual- and Household-Level Variables: Summary Statistics  
  Percentage/ Threshold Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ownership of bank account (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.840 0.366 0 1 
Race and ethnicity, financial respondent 
 
    
   White, non-Hispanic (No=0, Yes=1) 75.21     
   Black, non-Hispanic (No=0, Yes=1) 17.50     
   Hispanic (No=0, Yes=1) 7.28     
Race and ethnicity, couple households 
 
    
   White - White (No=0, Yes=1) 74.32     
   White - Minority (No=0, Yes=1) 1.48     
   Minority - Minority (No=0, Yes=1) 24.18     
Gender (Female =0, Male = 1) 
 
0.429 0.495 0 1 
Age  68.439 9.924 51 90 
Education  
 
    
   Less than high school (No=0, Yes=1) 24.68     
   High school graduate (No=0, Yes=1) 31.29     
   Some college or more (No=0,Yes=1) 44.02     
Couple Household (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.499 0.500 0 1 
Household size 
 
2.024 1.141 1 18 
Works (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.358 0.479 0 1 
Receiving Social Security (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.632 0.482 0 1 
Receiving Private Pension (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.308 0.461 0 1 
Household Annual Income (2012 $US)   55,821   248,075  0     60,000,000  
Household Annual Income, tertiles            
   Tertile 1   ≤19,176      
   Tertile 2   19,177 to 47,935      
   Tertile 3   >47,936     
Household wealth (2012 $US) 
 
404,115 1,126,671 -2,245,500 90,700,000 
Household wealth, tertiles  
 
2.045 0.810 1 3 
   Tertile 1   ≤48,000     
   Tertile 2   48,001 to 262,300      
   Tertile 3   >262,300     
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Home ownership 
 
    
   No home ownership (No=0, Yes-1) 23.51     
   Owns home with mortgage (No=0, Yes-1) 48.29     
   Owns home without mortgage (No=0, Yes-1) 28.20     
Owns Vehicles (No=0, Yes-1) 
 
0.829 0.376 0 1 
Has Debt (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.301 0.459 0 1 
Overall Health index (standardized) 0.021 0.985 -3.966 1.724 
Cognitive ability index (standardized)  
 
0.022 0.973 -2.841 2.253 
Cognitive ability index, quartiles           
   Quartile 1 ≤-0.665     
   Quartile 2 -0.666 to 0.103     
   Quartile 3 0.104 to 0.765     
   Quartile 4 >0.765     
Nativity, 5 regions 
     
United States 94.57     
Mexico 1.16     
Central and South America, Cuba 1.30     
Caribbean 0.63     
Other 2.35     
Citizenship (No=0, Yes=1) 
 
0.951 0.216 0 1 
Social Security Number consent  
 
    
   missing (No=0, Yes=1) 21.35     
   refuse (No=0, Yes=1) 24.46     
   provide (No=0, Yes=1) 54.20     
Spanish survey (No=0,Yes=1)    0.028 0.166 0 1 
Notes: N=74,945. All individual-level variables refer to the household financial respondent. N=37,454 for percentages of 
race/ethnicity for couple households. Data on nativity was obtained from restricted version of HRS. Source: Health and Retirement 
Study, waves 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012.  
	TABLE 2 – Neighborhood-Level Variables: Summary Statistics  
  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
NSES index -0.08 0.94 -3.83 3.54 
Number of financial institutions (weighted by population) 0.02 0.06 0 3.45 
Blacks residents, percentage 16.52 26.23 0 100 
Hispanics residents, percentage 12.65 19.89 0 100 
Whites residents, percentage 73.33 27.73 0 100 
English language, percentage 82.44 18.56 0 100 
Spanish language, percentage 10.95 17.13 0 100 
Notes: N=74,945, unless stated otherwise. NSES index is the neighborhood socioeconomic status index constructed as the principal 
component of median household income, median household value, percentage of households with interest income, percentage of 
residents with high school, percentage of residents with college, and percentage of residents in managerial positions (we follow the 
methodology of Diez Roux et al. 2001). All variables correspond to the census tract where HRS households reside at the time of the 
HRS interview. Source: components of NSES index and the percentage of Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites residents, and English and 
Spanish languages are at the census tract level and taken from the United States Census of 2000 and the American Community Survey 
(ACS) of 2009, 2010 and 2012. Number of financial institutions at the census tract level is obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2015. We use population benchmarks from Census and ACS for constructing the weighted number of financial institutions.  
 	  
	 37	
TABLE 3. Percentage of Financial Respondents 51 Years and Older Who Do Not Own a Bank Account at the Household Level by 
Race and Ethnicity  
  2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2000-12 
White (%) 10% 7% 7% 8% 7% 9% 11% 9% 
Black (%)  39% 34% 32% 30% 30% 37% 38% 35% 
Hispanic (%) 32% 31% 37% 35% 38% 42% 46% 38% 
Observations 10,753 10,063 10,930 10,601 10,035 11,456 11,107 74,945 
Notes: Ownership of a bank refers to whether the household owns a checking, saving, or money market account. Percentages are calculated using 
only the household financial respondent. We use year-specific weights to compute percentages in each year. For the percentage during the period 
2000-2012, we use a base weight, which is the weight of the individual when it entered the survey. Source: Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012
	 38	
TABLE 4. Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent – 
Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Black -0.1481*** -0.1341*** -0.1189*** -0.1206*** -0.1196*** -0.1227*** -0.1202***  
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Hispanic -0.1541*** -0.1389*** -0.1287*** -0.1177*** -0.1172*** -0.0847*** -0.0830***  
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
Home owner, no mort. 
 
-0.0081 -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0080   
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Home owner, w/mort. 
 
0.0024 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0024   
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Vehicle ownership 
 
0.0648*** 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0639*** 0.0640*** 0.0641***   
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Debt ownership 
 
0.0356*** 0.0359*** 0.0359*** 0.0359*** 0.0358*** 0.0359***   
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Overall Health Index 
  
0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***    
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Cognition, quartile 2 
  
0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109***    
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Cognition, quartile 3 
  
0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0166***    
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Cognition, quartile 4 
  
0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0196*** 0.0195***    
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Foreign born, Mexico 
   
-0.1492*** -0.1492*** -0.0525* -0.0513*     
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0295) (0.0295) 
Foreign born, SA,CA,CU 
   
-0.0269 -0.0271 0.0534* 0.0532*     
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
Foreign born, Caribbean 
   
0.0246 0.0248 0.0599* 0.0601**     
(0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
Foreign born, Other 
   
-0.0313 -0.0303 -0.0256 -0.0255     
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) 
No citizenship 
   
-0.0393* -0.0388* -0.0344 -0.0333     
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
SSN, refuse to provide 
    
-0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0070      
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
SSN, provided 
    
-0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0022      
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Spanish survey 
     
-0.1628*** -0.1625***       
(0.0141) (0.0141) 
NSES index 
      
0.0046**        
(0.0021) 
Ln(Finc. inst. weig.) 
      
0.0007        
(0.0008) 
R-sqr., overall 0.223 0.239 0.244 0.245 0.245 0.247 0.248 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CA is Central America 
and SA South America. Estimated coefficients for male, education, age, age squared, couple, household size, income and wealth 
tertiles, employment, receive social security benefits and pension income, mean of all time variant variables (except NSES index 
and financial institutions), year and state dummies and constant are omitted in the interest of space. See Table A5 in Appendix for 
full set of estimates. 
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Notes: No. of obs.= 37,454, No. of ind. = 9,850. Coefficients for mixed and minority couple indicators are reported (White couples 
are the reference group). Mixed couples are defined as those where one member is Black or Hispanic and the other person is White; 
minority couples are defined as those where both members are either Black or Hispanic; and White couples are defined as those where 
both members are White. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CA is Central America and SA South America. 
Estimated coefficients for male, education, age, age squared, couple, household size, wealth and income tertiles, employment, receive 
social security benefits and pension income, mean of all time variant variables (except NSES index and financial institutions), year 
and state dummies and constant are omitted in the interest of space.  
 
 
TABLE 5. Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent (FR) 
and Spouse (S) – Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mixed couple -0.0335*** -0.0303** -0.0283** -0.0286** -0.0287** -0.0298** -0.0288** 
    (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Minority couple -0.1333*** -0.1195*** -0.1085*** -0.1074*** -0.1063*** -0.1010*** -0.0985*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) 
Home owner, no mortgage  -0.0108 -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0118 -0.0122 -0.0117   (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Home owner, w/mortgage  -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0029 
  (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Vehicle ownership  0.0748*** 0.0740*** 0.0740*** 0.0740*** 0.0741*** 0.0742*** 
  (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Debt ownership  0.0349*** 0.0352*** 0.0352*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 
  (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Overall Health Index   0.0068* 0.0068* 0.0069* 0.0069* 0.0069*    (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Cognition, quartile 2   0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0183*** 0.0183*** 
   (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Cognition, quartile 3   0.0228*** 0.0228*** 0.0228*** 0.0228*** 0.0229*** 
   (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Cognition, quartile 4   0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0246*** 0.0246*** 
   (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
Foreign born, Mexico    -0.1542*** -0.1530*** -0.0586 -0.0584     (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0373) (0.0373) 
Foreign born, SA, CA, 
Cuba    -0.0059 -0.0047 0.0855** 0.0837**     (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0369) (0.0369) 
Foreign born, Caribbean    0.0048 0.0065 0.0394 0.0393     (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0412) 
Foreign born, Other    -0.0506* -0.0483* -0.0468* -0.0471* 
    (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0282) 
No citizenship    -0.0431 -0.0409 -0.0401 -0.0399 
    (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) 
SSN, refuse to provide     -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0053 
     (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
SSN, provided     -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 
     (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Spanish survey      -0.1409*** -0.1409*** 
      (0.0168) (0.0168) 
NSES index       0.0042        (0.0026) 
Ln(Finc. inst. weig.)       0.0013 
       (0.0010) 
R-sqr, overall 0.189 0.202 0.205 0.207 0.207 0.208 0.209 
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TABLE 6 - Determinants of the Minority Gap in Bank Account Ownership by SES Group 
(race/ethnicity of the household financial respondent) 
 Panel A Income (I)  
  I < Median I ≥ Median Chi-squared test 
Black -0.1411*** -0.0779*** 70.7 
 (0.0072) (0.0066) [0.00] 
Hispanic -0.0952*** -0.0697*** 4.89 
 (0.0121) (0.0106) [0.02] 
 Panel B Wealth (W)  
  W < Median W ≥ Median Chi-squared test 
Black -0.1283*** -0.0624*** 41.89 
 (0.0071) (0.0069) [0.00] 
Hispanic -0.0880*** -0.0508*** 4.65 
 (0.0122) (0.0103) [0.03] 
 Panel C Neighborhood Socio-Economic Status (NSES)  
  NSES < Median NSES ≥ Median Chi-squared test 
Black -0.1166*** -0.1012*** 5.26 
 (0.0070) (0.0077) [0.02] 
Hispanic -0.0823*** -0.0812*** 0.12 
  (0.0124) (0.0113) [0.72] 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Coefficients for Black and Hispanic indicators are 
reported (Whites are the reference group). They are estimated using the specification in column (7) of 
Table 4 and separately for the different groups indicated in the Table. Standard errors are in 
parentheses; significance level denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report a Chi-squared 
test (with p-value in brackets) for the equality of coefficients between groups. See Table A10 in 
Appendix for full set of estimates. 
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TABLE 7. Determinants of the Minority Gap in Bank Account Ownership Controlling for 
Race/Ethnicity and Language in Neighborhood (race/ethnicity of the financial respondent) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black -0.1176*** -0.1143*** -0.1202*** -0.1173*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Hispanic -0.0758*** -0.1026*** -0.0757*** -0.1015*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0089) 
Spanish survey -0.1569***  -0.1561***  
 (0.0142)  (0.0143)  
Blacks, percent -0.0003 -0.0004*   
 (0.0002) (0.0002)   
Hispanics, percent -0.0004*** -0.0006***   
 (0.0001) (0.0001)   
Whites, percent -0.0002 -0.0003   
 (0.0002) (0.0002)   
English language, percent   -0.0003 -0.0004 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Spanish language, percent   -0.0007** -0.0010*** 
   (0.0003) (0.0003) 
R-sqr, overall 0.248 0.246 0.248 0.246 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Other regressors are as in column (7) of Table (4). The full set of estimated coefficients 
is available upon request.   
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TABLE 8. Determinants of the Minority Gap in Bank Account Ownership by Race/Ethnicity and 
language at the census tract Group (race/ethnicity of the financial respondent) 
 Panel A Hispanics in census tract, percentage (H)  
  H < Median H ≥ Median Chi-squared test 
Black -0.1225*** -0.1223*** 0.01 
 (0.0070) (0.0074) [0.90] 
Hispanic -0.0306 -0.0857*** 1.99 
 (0.0245) (0.0096) [0.15] 
 Panel B Spanish language census tract, percentage (S)  
  S < Median S ≥ Median Chi-squared test 
Black -0.1249*** -0.1201*** 0.03 
 (0.0071) (0.0071) [0.86] 
Hispanic -0.0095 -0.0870*** 5.07 
  (0.0234) (0.0097) [0.02] 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Coefficients for Black and Hispanic indicators are 
reported (Whites are the reference group). They are estimated using the specification in column (7) of 
Table 4 and separately for the different groups indicated in the Table. Standard errors are in parentheses; 
significance level denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report a Chi-squared test (with p-value 
in brackets) for the equality of coefficients between groups.   	  
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APPENDIX (ONLINE, SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL) 
Table A1 - Description of Variable Construction and Source  
Variable name Description 
Source: HRS (Health and Retirement Study). RAND HRS Version O. 
Ownership of bank account The HRS asks “Do you [or your husband/wife/partner] have any checking or 
savings accounts or money market funds?” Ownership of bank account is a 
dichotomous indicator for financial inclusion, taking value 1 if the answer to this 
question is affirmative and 0 otherwise.  
Race/ethnicity (Fin. Resp.) Individuals are assigned to 3 mutually exclusive groups, White non-Hispanic, 
Black non-Hispanic, and Hispanic, after dropping respondents who report being 
of “other races” (about 5% of the sample).  
Race/ethnicity (Couple) We create the following 3 groups for couple race/ethnicity: 1) White-White, 2) 
White (Minority)-Minority (White), and 3) Minority-Minority.  
Gender (Male) Equal to 1 if male, 0 otherwise. 
Age Age in years. 
Education  We use indicators for less than high school, high school graduate, and some 
college or more. 
Couple Household Indicator equal to 1 if financial respondent is in a couple household, 0 otherwise.  
Household size Number of people living in the household. 
Works Indicator equal to 1 if currently working for pay, 0 otherwise. 
Receiving Soc. Sec. Indicator equal to 1 if currently receiving social security benefits, 0 otherwise. 
Receiving Priv. Pen. Indicator equal to 1 if currently receiving a pension, 0 otherwise. 
Income Household total income in 2012 $US. Indicators for income tertiles used in the 
regressions. 
Wealth Household total wealth in 2012 $US. Indicators for wealth tertiles are used in the 
regressions. 
Home and Mortgage ownership We create indicators accounting for home and mortgage ownership. One for no 
home ownership and no mortgage, one for home ownership but no mortgage, 
and one for home ownership with mortgage. 
Owns Vehicles Indicator equal to 1 for vehicle ownership, 0 otherwise. 
Has Debt Indicator equal to 1 if household has debt, 0 otherwise. 
Overall Health index An overall health index is constructed following Michaud and van Soest (2008). 
We obtain the principal component of the following variables: self-reported 
health, severe condition indicator, mild condition indicator, CESD score, and at 
least one difficulty with activities of daily living. The severe condition indicator 
is equal to 1 if the individual ever suffered cancer or a malignant tumor of any 
kind except skin cancer; chronic lung disease except asthma such as chronic 
bronchitis or emphysema; heart attack, coronary heart disease, angina, 
congestive heart failure, or other heart problems; and/or stroke or transient 
ischemic attack (TIA). The mild condition indicator that is equal to 1 if the 
individual ever had high blood pressure or hypertension; diabetes or high blood 
sugar; emotional, nervous, or psychiatric problems; and/or arthritis or 
rheumatism. The health index is transformed so that higher values represent 
better health and standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  
Cognitive Ability index Cognitive ability index is constructed using the principal component of two 
cognitive tests scores, namely the serial of 7 test score and the total word recall 
score. The serial 7 test score provides the number of correct subtractions in the 
serial 7s test. This test asks the individual to subtract 7 from the prior number, 
beginning with 100 for five trials. The total word recall variable is the sum of the 
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immediate and delayed word recall scores (10 words recall). The index is 
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  
Citizenship Indicator equal to 1 if citizen, 0 otherwise. 
SSN consent  Indicators for missing consent to share SSN (Social Security Number) for 
administrative data linkage, for no SSN consent, and for given SSN consent. 
Spanish survey Indicator equal to 1 if HRS survey was answered in Spanish, 0 otherwise. In all 
waves but 2000, there is a specific question about whether the questionnaire was 
administered in Spanish or English. In the 2000 wave, the percentage of the 
questionnaire that was answered in Spanish is provided. In this case, we set 
Spanish survey equal to 1 if this percentage is at least 75%.  
Source: HRS (Health and Retirement Study). Cross-Wave Geographic Information (Detail). Restricted Data, 
accessed at RAND. 
Census tract Census tract of the residence of the individual at the time the HRS wave. 
State State in which the individual resides at the time of the HRS wave. We created 
state dummies, which we include in our model. 
Nativity (5 groups) Separate individuals by the nativity in five groups. Indicator equal to 0 if not 
foreign born (United States), equal to 1 if born in Mexico, equal to 2 if born in 
Central and South America and Cuba, equal to 3 if born in a Caribbean country, 
and equal to 4 if born in other region.  
Source: US Census and ACS (American Community Survey). Data purchased from GeoLytics. 
NSES  index The NSES index is constructed following Diez Roux et al. (2001) by estimating 
the principal component of the following variables: 1) median household income 
(natural log), 2) median value of housing units (natural log), 3) percent 
households with interest, dividend, or rental income, 4) percent of residents 25 
years and older with a high school degree, 5) percent of residents 25 years and 
older with a college degree, and 6) percent of residents in executive, managerial, 
or professional specialty occupations. To construct this index we use data from 
the 2000 United States Census and the 2009, 2010 and 2012 American 
Community Survey (ACS). The reference geographic unit is a Census tract and 
the created NSES-DR index is associated to each HRS respondent using 
restricted HRS geographic identifiers and the time when the HRS survey was 
administered. Specifically, we use the NSES-DR index based on the 2000 Census 
for the HRS 2000, 2002 and 2004 waves; the one based on the 2009 ACS for the 
HRS 2006 and 2008 waves; the one based on the 2010 ACS for the HRS 2010 
wave; and the one based on the 2012 ACS for the HRS 2012 wave.  
Racial/ethnic composition of 
neighborhood 
We created three indicators at the census tract level to account for racial/ethnic 
composition of the neighborhood: percent of residents in the census tract that are 
Black, Hispanic and White. 
Language in neighborhood We created two indicators at the census tract level to account for language spoken 
in the neighborhood: percent of residents in the census tract that are speak 
English and Spanish. 
Source: FDIC(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). Data provided by the FDIC 
Number of financial institutions 
(weighted by population) 
We use data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 2016) that 
identifies the location of each financial institution branch, and construct the 
number of financial institutions at the census tract level during the years 2000-
2012. We construct a weighted indicator by dividing the number of financial 
institutions by the population in the census tract. In the empirical analysis, we 
consider the number (in natural log) of financial institutions in the census tract 
where the individual resides in the year of the survey. For those census tracts in 
which we did not observe that a financial institution was located, we set the 
number of financial institutions equal to zero. When taking the log, these 
observations were set equal to a number slightly below the minimum taken by 
the log-transformed variable (natural log of 0.5).  
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TABLE A2. Distribution of Race and Ethnicity by Wave 
(analytic sample, financial respondents only)  
Year 
 White, 
non-Hispanic 
Black, 
non-Hispanic 
Hispanic Total 
2000 Frequency 8,444 1,653 656 10,753 
 Percent 78.53 15.37 6.10 100 
2002 Frequency 7,885 1,542 636 10,063 
 Percent 78.36 15.32 6.32 100 
2004 Frequency 8,374 1,771 785 10,930 
 Percent 76.61 16.20 7.18 100 
2006 Frequency 8,137 1,681 783 10,601 
 Percent 76.76 15.86 7.39 100 
2008 Frequency 7,631 1,629 775 10,035 
 Percent 76.04 16.23 7.72 100 
2010 Frequency 8,097 2,453 906 11,456 
 Percent 70.68 21.41 7.91 100 
2012 Frequency 7,804 2,387 916 11,107 
 Percent 70.26 21.49 8.25 100 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
 
	 46	
 
Table A3. Summary Statistics by Racial/Ethnic Groups, Selected Variables 
 White Black (1) Mean Hispanic (2) Mean 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Difference Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Ownership of bank account (No=0, Yes=1) 0.908 0.289 0.642 0.479 0.266 0.611 0.488 0.297 
Education, less than high school (No=0, Yes=1) 0.186 0.389 0.383 0.486 -0.196 0.545 0.498 -0.359 
Education, high school graduate (No=0, Yes=1) 0.337 0.473 0.261 0.439 0.076 0.186 0.389 0.152 
Education, some college or more (No=0,Yes=1) 0.476 0.499 0.356 0.479 0.121 0.269 0.443 0.207 
Age 69.189 9.970 65.910 9.441 3.279 66.775 9.370 2.414 
Household wealth (2012 $US) 497,286 1,267,828 109,461 369,094 387,825 149,854 372,092 347,432 
Household Annual Income, tertiles  63,169 284,387 34,212 46,126 28,958 31,853 48,582 31,316 
Overall Health index (standardized) 0.097 0.951 -0.198 1.025 0.295 -0.232 1.101 0.328 
Cognitive ability index (standardized)  0.193 0.893 -0.519 1.034 0.712 -0.429 0.986 0.622 
Notes: N = 74,945 (N White = 56,372, N Black = 13,116 , N Hispanic = 5,457).  
(1) Mean Difference = Mean White – Mean Black ; all variable means are significantly different between Whites and Blacks at the 1 percent level. 
(2) Mean Difference = Mean White – Mean Hispanic; all variable means are significantly different between Whites and Hispanic at the 1 percent level. 
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Table A4. Bank Account Ownership Wave-Transitions by Race and Ethnicity (percentages)  
 Whites, non-Hispanic   
  Wave t+1 
  No Yes 
Wave t No 35 65 Yes 7 93 
 Total 9 91 
 Blacks, non-Hispanic   
  Wave t+1 
  No Yes 
Wave t No 64 36 Yes 20 80 
 Total 34 66 
 Hispanics   
  Wave t+1 
  No Yes 
Wave t No 66 34 Yes 25 76 
 Total 40 60 
Source: HRS, 2000-2012. Numbers represent percentage of households transitioning 
from one bank ownership state in wave t to a different bank ownership state in wave 
t+1. For instance, the first entry for Whites indicates that 35% of households with no 
bank account in wave t have no bank account in wave t+1. Totals indicate the fractions 
of individuals without and with bank account over the observation period 2000-2012 
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TABLE A5. Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent 
– Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Black -0.1481*** -0.1341*** -0.1189*** -0.1206*** -0.1196*** -0.1227*** -0.1202*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Hispanic -0.1541*** -0.1389*** -0.1287*** -0.1177*** -0.1172*** -0.0847*** -0.0830*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
Home owner, no 
mort.  -0.0081 -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0080  
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Home owner, 
w/mort.  0.0024 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0024 
  (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Vehicle ownership  0.0648*** 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0639*** 0.0640*** 0.0641*** 
  (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Debt ownership  0.0356*** 0.0359*** 0.0359*** 0.0359*** 0.0358*** 0.0359*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Overall Health Index   0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***    (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Cognition, quartile 2   0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 
   (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Cognition, quartile 3   0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0166*** 
   (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Cognition, quartile 4   0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0196*** 0.0195*** 
   (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Foreign born, 
Mexico    -0.1492*** -0.1492*** -0.0525* -0.0513* 
    (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0295) (0.0295) 
Foreign born, 
SA,CA,CU    -0.0269 -0.0271 0.0534* 0.0532*     (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
Foreign born, 
Caribbean    0.0246 0.0248 0.0599* 0.0601**     (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
Foreign born, Other    -0.0313 -0.0303 -0.0256 -0.0255     (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) 
No citizenship    -0.0393* -0.0388* -0.0344 -0.0333 
    (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
SSN, refuse to 
provide     -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0070 
     (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
SSN, provided     -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0022 
     (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Spanish survey      -0.1628*** -0.1625*** 
      (0.0141) (0.0141) 
NSES index       0.0046** 
       (0.0021) 
Ln(Finc. inst. weig.)       0.0007 
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       (0.0008) 
Gender -0.0376*** -0.0387*** -0.0362*** -0.0360*** -0.0361*** -0.0355*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Age 0.0133*** 0.0116** 0.0100** 0.0100** 0.0098** 0.0100** 0.0099** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Age squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
High school graduate  0.0724*** 0.0648*** 0.0498*** 0.0482*** 0.0483*** 0.0458*** 0.0455*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Some college or 
more  0.0844*** 0.0740*** 0.0529*** 0.0514*** 0.0513*** 0.0487*** 0.0476*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Couple household -0.0042 -0.0096 -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0096 -0.0095 -0.0095 
 (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) 
Household size -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Income, tertile 2 0.0290*** 0.0271*** 0.0268*** 0.0268*** 0.0268*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Income, tertile 3 0.0366*** 0.0350*** 0.0346*** 0.0346*** 0.0346*** 0.0344*** 0.0343*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Wealth, tertile 2 0.0458*** 0.0468*** 0.0463*** 0.0463*** 0.0463*** 0.0463*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Wealth, tertile 3 0.0704*** 0.0724*** 0.0718*** 0.0718*** 0.0718*** 0.0718*** 0.0716*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Works 0.0182*** 0.0172*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Receives social 
security 0.0125*** 0.0126*** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0118** 0.0118** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Receives pension 0.0183*** 0.0172*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Coefficients of mean for time variant variables 
Age -0.0132** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.0169*** -0.0156*** -0.0156*** -0.0155*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Age squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Household couple -0.0016 -0.0125 -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0120 -0.0105 -0.0099 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Household size -0.0127*** -0.0114*** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0109*** -0.0106*** -0.0106*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Income, tertile 2 0.1078*** 0.0739*** 0.0642*** 0.0638*** 0.0636*** 0.0611*** 0.0608*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
Income, tertile 3 0.1388*** 0.1101*** 0.0955*** 0.0947*** 0.0945*** 0.0929*** 0.0917*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Wealth, tertile 2 0.0986*** 0.0746*** 0.0670*** 0.0666*** 0.0673*** 0.0653*** 0.0646*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
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Wealth, tertile 3 0.0585*** 0.0567*** 0.0448*** 0.0436*** 0.0445*** 0.0426*** 0.0396*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Works 0.0158** 0.0017 -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0083 -0.0085 -0.0086 
 (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
Receives social 
security -0.0096 -0.0107 -0.0118 -0.0111 -0.0105 -0.0083 -0.0082 
 (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Receives pension 0.0228*** 0.0161** 0.0128* 0.0129* 0.0128* 0.0114* 0.0115* 
 (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Home owner,   0.0073 0.0098 0.0119 0.0120 0.0129 0.0142 
  no mortgage  (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
Home owner, 
w/mortgage  0.0018 0.0029 0.0040 0.0041 0.0047 0.0047 
  (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Vehicle ownership  0.0680*** 0.0589*** 0.0588*** 0.0593*** 0.0563*** 0.0562*** 
  (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
Debt ownership  0.0497*** 0.0463*** 0.0456*** 0.0450*** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 
  (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Overall Health Index   0.0029 0.0029 0.0030 0.0028 0.0028    (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Cognition, quartile 2   0.0596*** 0.0592*** 0.0594*** 0.0586*** 0.0585*** 
   (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
Cognition, quartile 3   0.0720*** 0.0718*** 0.0718*** 0.0716*** 0.0714*** 
   (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
Cognition, quartile 4   0.0688*** 0.0692*** 0.0691*** 0.0696*** 0.0689*** 
   (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
SSN, refuse to 
provide     -0.0079 -0.0082 -0.0083 
     (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
SSN, provided     -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0024 
     (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
R-sqr, within 0.0128 0.0173 0.0177 0.0177 0.0177 0.0182 0.0182 
R-sqr, between 0.355 0.380 0.386 0.388 0.388 0.391 0.391 
R-sqr, overall 0.223 0.239 0.244 0.245 0.245 0.247 0.248 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CA is Central America 
and SA South America. Estimated coefficients for year and state dummies and constant are omitted in the interest of space.  	 	
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TABLE A6. Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent – 
Random Effects (RE) Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Black -0.1657*** -0.1508*** -0.1405*** -0.1421*** -0.1416*** -0.1445*** -0.1404*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0052) 
Hispanic -0.1734*** -0.1592*** -0.1515*** -0.1394*** -0.1390*** -0.1027*** -0.0997*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
Home owner, no mort.  0.0108** 0.0098** 0.0110** 0.0111** 0.0109** 0.0125***  
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Home owner, w/mort.  0.0236*** 0.0217*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0221*** 0.0226*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Vehicle ownership  0.1076*** 0.1024*** 0.1025*** 0.1026*** 0.1010*** 0.1010*** 
  (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Debt ownership  0.0494*** 0.0499*** 0.0497*** 0.0496*** 0.0493*** 0.0494*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Overall Health Index   0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0114***    (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Cognition, quartile 2   0.0345*** 0.0344*** 0.0344*** 0.0342*** 0.0341*** 
   (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Cognition, quartile 3   0.0470*** 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.0467*** 
   (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Cognition, quartile 4   0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 0.0525*** 0.0519*** 
   (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Foreign born, Mexico    -0.1559*** -0.1558*** -0.0489* -0.0469 
    (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
Foreign born, SA,CA,CU    -0.0286 -0.0285 0.0605** 0.0601**     (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0291) (0.0291) 
Foreign born, Caribbean    0.0166 0.0167 0.0557* 0.0556*     (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) 
Foreign born, Other    -0.0348 -0.0340 -0.0288 -0.0287 
    (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0220) 
No citizenship    -0.0399* -0.0397* -0.0349 -0.0331 
    (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
SSN, refuse to provide     -0.0101** -0.0102** -0.0103** 
     (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
SSN, provided     -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0032 
     (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Spanish survey      -0.1796*** -0.1790*** 
      (0.0141) (0.0141) 
NSES index       0.0068*** 
       (0.0020) 
Ln(Finc. inst. weig.)       0.0009 
       (0.0008) 
R-sqr, overall 0.214 0.232 0.236 0.237 0.237 0.240 0.240 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CA is Central America 
and SA South America. Estimated coefficients for male, age, age squared, education, couple, household size, income and wealth 
tertiles, work status, receive social security benefits and pension income, year and state dummies and constant are omitted in the 
interest of space.  
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TABLE A7. Distribution of Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent (FR) and 
Spouse (S) by Waves 
 
Year 
 FR White –  
S White 
FR/S White - 
S/FR Minority 
FR Minority - 
S Minority 
Total 
2000 Frequency 4,606 128 854 5,588 
 Percent 82.43 2.29 15.28 100 
2002 Frequency 4,175 113 807 5,095 
 Percent 81.94 2.22 15.84 100 
2004 Frequency 4,458 150 933 5,541 
 Percent 80.45 2.71 16.84 100 
2006 Frequency 4,297 153 864 5,314 
 Percent 80.86 2.88 16.26 100 
2008 Frequency 3,989 143 847 4,979 
 Percent 80.12 2.87 17.01 100 
2010 Frequency 4,221 219 1,147 5,587 
 Percent 75.55 3.92 20.53 100 
2012 Frequency 4,004 210 1,136 5,350 
 Percent 74.84 3.93 21.23 100 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
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TABLE A8-Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent (FR) 
and Spouse (S) – Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model – reducing sample for households where FR & S 
have same level of education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mixed 
couple -0.0383** -0.0328* -0.0310* -0.0315* -0.0313* -0.0329** -0.0326* 
    (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) 
Minority 
couple -0.1368*** -0.1265*** -0.1172*** -0.1203*** -0.1201*** -0.1144*** -0.1131*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
Notes: No. of obs.= 21,018, No. of ind. = 5,403. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A9-Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial Respondent (FR) and 
Spouse (S) – Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model – using 4 categories 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FR-White, 
S-Min 
    
-0.0221 -0.0201 -0.0203 -0.0214 -0.0213 -0.0216 -0.0208 
(0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
FR-Min, 
S-White 
  
-0.0495*** -0.0447** -0.0395** -0.0388** -0.0390** -0.0413** -0.0402** 
(0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Minority 
couple 
-0.1334*** -0.1196*** -0.1086*** -0.1076*** -0.1064*** -0.1011*** -0.0987*** 
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) 
Notes: No. of obs.= 37,454, No. of ind. =9,850. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A10. Determinants of Ownership of Bank Account, Race and Ethnicity for Financial 
Respondent by Income, Wealth, and NSES index below or above or equal Median Groups – 
Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model 
  
(1)  
I<Med 
(2)  
I≥Med 
(3) 
W<Med 
(4) 
W≥Med 
(5)  
N<Med 
(6)  
N≥Med 
Black -0.1411*** -0.0779*** -0.1283*** -0.0624*** -0.1166*** -0.1012*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0077) 
Hispanic -0.0952*** -0.0697*** -0.0880*** -0.0508*** -0.0823*** -0.0812*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0103) (0.0124) (0.0113) 
Home owner, no mort. -0.0086 -0.0019 0.0056 -0.0087 -0.0106 -0.0142*  
(0.0106) (0.0086) (0.0101) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0086) 
Home owner, w/mort. -0.0029 0.0087 0.0065 0.0024 0.0055 -0.0042 
 (0.0118) (0.0084) (0.0105) (0.0097) (0.0116) (0.0087) 
Vehicle ownership 0.0743*** 0.0417*** 0.0774*** 0.0190** 0.0854*** 0.0365*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0076) (0.0090) (0.0072) 
Debt ownership 0.0499*** 0.0197*** 0.0522*** 0.0131*** 0.0462*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0042) 
Overall Health Index 0.0070* 0.0050 0.0086** 0.0034 0.0074* 0.0059*  (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0032) 
Cognition, quartile 2 0.0105 0.0142** 0.0160** 0.0015 0.0109* 0.0082 
 (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0056) 
Cognition, quartile 3 0.0164** 0.0144** 0.0185** 0.0089* 0.0177** 0.0111* 
 (0.0078) (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0054) (0.0075) (0.0061) 
Cognition, quartile 4 0.0198** 0.0199*** 0.0242** 0.0106* 0.0119 0.0204*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0060) (0.0091) (0.0068) 
Foreign born, Mexico -0.0340 -0.0928** -0.0512 -0.0593 -0.0655 -0.0334 
 (0.0377) (0.0413) (0.0401) (0.0363) (0.0413) (0.0400) 
Foreign born, SA,CA,CU 0.0543 0.0232 0.0470 0.0354 0.0639 0.0616*  (0.0380) (0.0370) (0.0412) (0.0315) (0.0430) (0.0349) 
Foreign born, Caribbean 0.0572 0.0214 0.0450 0.0587* 0.0515 0.0577  (0.0393) (0.0419) (0.0421) (0.0345) (0.0449) (0.0358) 
Foreign born, Other -0.0232 -0.0393 -0.0179 -0.0172 -0.0234 -0.0183 
 (0.0300) (0.0270) (0.0323) (0.0230) (0.0329) (0.0265) 
No citizenship -0.0301 -0.0372 -0.0410 -0.0100 -0.0359 -0.0167 
 (0.0309) (0.0291) (0.0334) (0.0245) (0.0347) (0.0277) 
SSN, refuse to provide -0.0120 -0.0052 -0.0073 -0.0057 -0.0082 0.0021 
 (0.0096) (0.0062) (0.0101) (0.0055) (0.0093) (0.0066) 
SSN, provided -0.0001 -0.0056 -0.0014 -0.0030 -0.0032 0.0073 
 (0.0077) (0.0051) (0.0081) (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.0054) 
Spanish survey -0.1661*** -0.1207*** -0.1577*** -0.1596*** -0.1294*** -0.2308*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0231) (0.0183) (0.0213) (0.0189) (0.0198) 
NSES index 0.0078** 0.0049** 0.0096*** 0.0050**   
 (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0020)   
Ln(Finc. inst. weig.) 0.0001 0.0016* 0.0003 0.0009 0.0012 0.0004 
 (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Observations 37,469 37,476 37,470 37,475 37,472 37,473 
R-sqr, overall 0.251 0.0839 0.226 0.0580 0.261 0.166 
Notes: No. of obs.= 74,945, No. of ind. = 18,582. Significance denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CA is Central America and SA 
South America. Estimated coefficients for male, age, age squared, education, couple, household size, income and wealth tertiles, work status, 
receive social security benefits and pension income, mean of all time variant variables (except NSES index and financial institutions), year and 
state dummies and constant are omitted in the interest of space.  
